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ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this paper we analyze the extent to which Chinese demand enhanced the performance of 
Latin American economies in the period of economic boom that took place from the turn of 
the century until the run up to the financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009.  It has been 
argued that China’s rise has been a blessing for the region because Chinese demand boosted 
exports and in part caused a hike in commodities prices worldwide.  We find that the direct 
impact on the region’s exports was much smaller than what was touted.  What’s more, we 
find that there were signs that China demand was accentuating concerns about the “resource 
curse” and deindustrialization in the region.  We come to these conclusions in the following 
manner.  First, we calculate the fastest growing and largest exports in LAC in the run up to 
the crisis.  To approximate the extent to which China demand propelled such exports, we 
calculate the percentage of global export growth in those LAC export growth sectors that 
was taken by China.  We then examine bi-lateral trade with China, analyzing the total amount 
and sectoral composition of such trade, and the major countries involved in China LAC 
trade.  We find that China had a significant direct and indirect impact on LAC exports, but 
only in a handful of countries and sectors. For those sectors, we show with the latest 
available projected data that despite pre-crisis projections to the contrary, the upward trend 
in prices clearly seems to have ended.  We then address the question of whether the China-
led boom and related price increases may have made these countries vulnerable to Dutch 
Disease, and finally whether the nations that benefited from China were equipped to fiscally 
reap transfer the benefits of the recent boom into diversified development for their 
populations.  In sum, we find that China had a relatively small impact on the region except in 
a small handful of countries and sectors. We also find little concrete evidence for a resource 
curse, though this needs to be studied in more depth.  We also find that contrary to past 
booms LAC has the mechanisms in place to transfer some of the rents from the boom 
period toward long run development. Unfortunately the current economic crisis will make 
addressing these issues even harder than before. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Latin American Economic Development, China trade, Commodity Boom 
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INTRODUCTION:  China trade: just what the doctor ordered? 
 
Before the current crisis, there is a polarization of views on China’s impact in Latin America. 
Some argued that the future of Latin American economic development is a bright one and 
China was to thank for it.  Others saw China as putting Latin America back into a world of 
primary product dependency and fiercely outperforming Latin America in global 
manufacturing markets.  We examine these claims in this paper and conclude that the latter 
claim is closer to the truth but far from certain. 
 
In a special report devoted to “China’s Thirst for Resources”, The Economist magazine argued 
that China’s growth provides an unparalleled opportunity for Latin America (and Africa): 
 
African and Latin American economies are growing at their fastest pace in decades, 
thanks in large part to heavy Chinese demand for their resources. China's burgeoning 
consumption has helped push the price of all manner of fuels, metals and grains to 
new peaks over the past year. Even the price of shipping raw materials recently 
reached a record. Analysts see little prospect of an end to the boom; the prices of a 
few commodities have fallen on the back of America's worsening economic outlook, 
but others, including oil, wheat and iron ore, continue to set new records. China, 
with about a fifth of the world's population, now consumes half of its cement, a 
third of its steel and over a quarter of its aluminum. Its imports of many natural 
resources are growing even faster than its bounding economy. Shipments of iron ore, 
for example, have risen by an average of 27% a year for the past four years (The 
Economist 2008: 3).  
 
The opportunities that China’s rise presents have also been highlighted in academic circles. 
A few examples will illustrate this point. The majority of studies on the issue of China’s 
impacts on LAC economies have been conducted by international financial institutions.  
Indeed, the most comprehensive assessments have been done by the World Bank, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB).  These studies share the perspective that China’s rise 
has been an important engine of Latin American growth.  
 
For example, a World Bank report argued that “the rising correlation between the growth of 
the two Asian economies [China and India] and LAC economies (with the exception of 
Central America and the Caribbean) seems to have been mainly driven by demand 
externalities and higher prices for commodities where LAC’s comparative advantage lies” 
(Lederman, Olarreaga, and Perry 2006). Similarly, Blázquez-Lidoy, Rodríguez and Santiso 
argue that “even when trade is concentrated in a small basket of commodities, China’s 
strong demand for raw materials is good news for Latin America. In economic terms, this 
event could be considered as a positive demand shock. Even more, there is a positive impact 
on the region, even though direct trade with China does not rise” (Blázquez-Lidoy, 
Rodríguez, and Santiso 2006).  
 
Finally, a landmark study conducted jointly by the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies at Harvard University, also 
captured this optimistic view: 
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China’s 1.3 billion people mean 1.3 billion potential consumers. Aggregate 
consumption in China is relatively low and bound to rise with growing levels of 
national income. Many Latin American countries are well positioned to supply the 
Chinese market with agricultural products, processed food, and beverages. For 
example, Argentina and Brazil have found and important market in China for their 
agro-food industries. As Chinese incomes grow, consumer tastes should also 
diversify, offering growth opportunities for exports such as wines, coffees, meats, 
fruits, and vegetables (some of which can exploit the inverted seasons of North-
South temperate zones.) China’s expansion has fueled strong external demand for 
nonagricultural raw and processed materials as well. Latin American countries are 
exploiting this opportunity. For example, Chile has found an important market in 
China for copper, ores, wood, pulp, and slag and ahs, while Brazil is selling iron ore 
and pellets (Devlin, Estevadeordal, and Rodriguez-Clare 2006).  
 
The other side of the coin of these optimistic assessments regarding the positive impact of 
China’s growth in Latin America has been a concern about the fact that China is 
accentuating LAC’s dependence on primary commodities which in turn could exacerbate 
long held concerns in the region over commodity dependence.  These concerns are rife 
throughout the literature.  For example, The World Bank says: 
 
The move towards natural-resource-intensive products implies a more concentrated 
export bundle in LAC. This raises concerns regarding the vulnerability of LAC to 
future (negative) terms of trade shocks, but more importantly there is also a feeling 
within LAC that the gains associated with natural-resource-intensive exports are not 
being widely spread. The economic, but also political, sustainability of this 
specialization in natural-resource-intensive sectors depends on the extent to which 
gains are shared with owners of other factors of production (Devlin, Estevadeordal, 
and Rodriguez-Clare 2006).   
 
This concern is also shared by Lall and Weiss, who argue that:  
 
LAC faces a more serious threat over the long term: the export specialization of 
most of LAC is heavily biased towards resource-based primary products, with a very 
small share of technology-intensive products. Chinese growth may thus constrain its 
ability to diversify into more dynamic and technologically advanced products, with 
potential harm to its dynamic comparative advantage (Lall and Weiss 2005).  
 
This paper builds on this previous work by looking deeper at both the nature of LAC 
exports to China and the extent to which a possible shift toward primary and resource-based 
products is of concern to the region. 
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ANALYSIS: LATIN AMERICAN COMMODITIES EXPORTS AND CHINA 
 
 
In this paper we analyze the extent to which Chinese demand is enhancing the 
performance of Latin American economies.  First, we calculate the fastest growing and 
largest exports in LAC in recent years.  To approximate the extent to which China demand 
has propelled such exports, we then calculate the percentage of global export growth in 
those LAC export growth sectors that is taken by China.  We then examine bi-lateral trade 
with China, analyzing the total amount and sectoral composition of such trade, and the 
major countries involved in China LAC trade.  We find that China is having a significant 
direct and indirect impact on LAC exports, but only in a handful of countries in sectors.   
 
We find that:   
 
• For almost all of LAC’s top commodities exports, China is responsible for a large 
part of global demand and is affecting price increases and exports for LAC; yet, 
• LAC exports to China were only 3.8 percent of all LAC exports.  In other words, 
96.2 percent of all LAC exports do not go to China; 
• LAC’s exports to China comprised 5.8 percent of Chinese imports, the same level of 
LAC exports to China in the 1980s;   
• 74 percent of all LAC exports to China were in primary commodities; 
• Growth in LAC exports to China was only 8 percent of all LAC export growth since 
the boom began in 2000; 
• 10 sectors in six countries account for 74 percent of all LAC exports to China and 91 
percent of all commodities exports to China; 
• For the other countries in LAC the potential to trade with China is very low. 
 
 
For those sectors that benefit from China trade, we show with the latest available 
projected data that despite pre-crisis projections to the contrary, the upward trend in prices 
clearly seems to have ended. We then address the question of that the China-led boom and 
related price increases may have made these countries vulnerable to Dutch Disease, and 
finally whether the nations that benefited from China were equipped to fiscally reap transfer 
the benefits of the recent boom into diversified development for their populations. 
 
In sum, we find that China is having a relatively small impact on the region except in 
a small handful of countries and sectors.  However, as of 2009 and in the wake of the 
financial and economic crisis that started in 2008, the prices in most of those sectors have 
already begun to drop, quite dramatically.  We also find little concrete evidence for a 
resource curse, though this needs to be studied in more depth.  We also find that contrary to 
past booms LAC has the mechanisms in place to transfer some of the rents from the recent 
boom toward long run development.   
 
For the majority of the calculations in this paper, we use trade data from the United 
Nations Statistics Division’s “Commodity Trade Statistics Database” (COMTRADE),. We 
download data at the three digit level (SITC Rev. 2) and classify it using Sanjaya Lall’s 
“Technological Classification of Exports” developed in (Lall 2000).  
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 Before the crisis, Latin American growth was being fueled by a commodities export 
boom.  GDP growth in LAC has increased by almost 3.2 percent per annum for a total of 19 
percent in real terms between 2000 and 2006.  Much of that growth is explained by an 
export boom.  Exports grew over 10 percent each year and total export growth during the 
period was 62.5 percent.  We calculate that the share of commodities export growth as a 
percent of total export growth in the region to be 70 percent.  In other words, commodities 
exports account for 70 percent of the growth in LAC exports since 2000. 
  
 World exports to China increased tenfold in real terms from 1985 to 2006, starting at 
$34 billion and reaching $384 billion by 2006.  One of the most marked changes, especially 
in just over the last decade, is the fact that developing countries have become a significant 
factor in China trade.  We calculate different regions’ shares of total exports to China and 
the percentage point change (PPC) between different time periods, 1995 to 2006 and 2000 to 
2006.  Developing countries comprised only 14.3 percent of the $83 billion of global exports 
to China in 1995, but by 2006 were supplying China with 50.3 percent of China’s $384 
billion of imports. Whereas the developed world was once the chief exporter to China (85 
percent in 1995), developed countries now supply just under half of all exports to China.  
Since 2000 there has been a 2.65 PPC in market share for developing countries.   
 
We also calculate commodities exports to China and learn that developing countries 
have become the largest commodities exporters to China.  In 1995 developed countries 
supplied 68.6 percent of all commodities exports to China but only 38.8 percent in 2006.  
Developing countries comprised of only 31.4 percent of commodities exports to China in 
1995 and by 2006 supplied 61.2 percent of those exports, a 29.7 PPC over the period.  The 
majority of that change has been captured by countries in the Soviet sphere of influence (FS) 
(14.4 PPC), Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) (5.9 PPC), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) 
(5.6 PPC), and South Asia (SA) (4.9 PPC).  By 2006, just over 40 percent of all commodities 
exports to China were from EAP, 22 percent from LAC. In the most recent period, between 
2000 and 2006, LAC has captured the majority of gains. 
 
China’s unprecedented economic growth and its entry into the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) have had direct and indirect effects, on LAC’s export and growth 
performances.  Direct effects result from bi-lateral LAC-China trade.  In-direct effects result 
from China’s overall demand for LAC’s top products and the extent to which that demand 
drove up prices for those products.  We address each in turn. 
 
Direct Effects 
 
Figures 1 and 2 exhibit LAC exports to China from 1985 to 2006 in broader context.  
Since 2000, exports have grown by 370 percent, dwarfing the overall LAC export growth of 
62.5 percent during the period.  This fact and figure have fueled the optimism described 
earlier in the literature review, but is often not discussed in its full context.  LAC exports to 
China were only 3.8 percent of all LAC exports.  In other words, 96.2 percent of all LAC 
exports do not go to China; LAC’s exports to China comprised 5.8 percent of Chinese 
imports, the same level of LAC exports to China in the 1980s.  Seventy-four percent of all 
LAC exports to China were in primary commodities.  Finally, growth in LAC exports to 
China was only 8 percent of all LAC export growth since the boom began in 2000; 
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Figure 1  
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Source: Authors calculations based on (United Nations Statistics Division 2008) 
 
Figure 2  
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Source: Authors calculations based on (United Nations Statistics Division 2008) 
 
 There is no doubt that China had a positive effect on LAC export growth during the 
boom.  In terms of bi-lateral trade however, the fanfare should be tempered.  The large 
increase in LAC exports to China has barely held ground in terms of total Chinese import 
shares, and trade to China is a relatively small amount of total LAC exports.  In addition, as 
we shall now see, only a small handful of countries and sectors account for almost all of the 
LAC export surge to China. 
 
The benefits of LAC-China trade are highly concentrated in a few countries and 
sectors.  Table 1 reveals that in 2006 just 10 sectors in six countries comprised 74 percent of 
all LAC exports to China and 91 percent of all commodities exports to China.  Indeed, the 
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top five sectors: Ores and concentrates of base metals (largely copper ores), Soybeans, Iron, 
Crude petroleum, and Copper Alloys were 60 percent of all exports to China and 75 percent 
of commodities exports to China.  
 
 
Table 1 
 
Sector
Crude petroleum 10.2% 8.3%
Ores and concentrates of base metals 20.6% 16.7%
Soybeans and other seeds 19.1% 15.6%
Iron ore and concentrates 14.5% 11.8%
Copper Alloys 9.6% 7.8%
Soybean oil and other oils 3.9% 3.2%
Non-ferrous base metal waste and scrap 3.6% 2.9%
Pulp and waste paper 3.6% 2.9%
Feedstuff 3.2% 2.6%
Meat 2.7% 2.2%
Total 90.8% 73.9%
Country  (2006)
(China Share in Total Country Exports in sector)
Chile (55%), Peru (32%)
Brazil (90%)
Peru (66%), Chile (26%)
Brazil (88 %)
Brazil (63%), Argentina (37%)
Mexico (45%), Colombia (29%)
Brazil (53%), Chile (46%)
Six Countries, Ten Sectors, Dominate LAC Trade to China
Argentina (43%), Brazil (41%)
Chile(89%)
Argentina( 84%)
Share of PRBP exports 
to China (2006)
Share of total 
LAC exports 
 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on (United Nations Statistics Division 2008) 
 
 
 
A mere handful of countries accounted for LAC exports to China in these 10 
commodities.  The final column in Table 3 exhibits the share of total LAC exports to China 
in a particular sector by country.  In other words, looking at the first row, Argentina and 
Brazil exported 43 and 41 percent respectively of all LAC crude petroleum exports to China 
(the majority of Venezuelan and Mexican oil exports are destined for the United States and 
do not reach China).  Brazil alone exported 90 percent of all LAC exports of Iron and 88 
percent of all Meat to China, Argentina exported 84 percent of all soybean oil.  This table 
reveals that just six countries dominated the majority of LAC exports to China:  Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru.  Four of the countries, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
and Peru, showed up as the most dominant exporters to China.  Mexico and Colombia 
accounted for the majority of exports of non-ferrous metal waste and scrap metal to China, 
but did not make a significant contribution to China exports in any other sector.  Other 
research that has compared the export basked of various LAC countries with the import 
potential of China and found that for countries and sectors other than those on this list the 
potential to trade with China in the future is very low (Blázquez-Lidoy, Rodríguez, and 
Santiso 2006). 
 
 
Finally, for the four major countries and sectors in Table 2 we calculate the ratio of 
China exports in a sector to a country’s total exports in that sector.  For some sectors China 
exports are very large part of a country’s total exports in a sector and a large percentage of 
total LAC exports in that sector. 
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Table 2 
 
Country, Sector Exports to China in Sector
(USD 2005)
Argentina
Crude petroluem 875,806,061 37%
Soybeans and other seeds 1,390,304,704 73.7%
Soybean oil and other oils 645,112,304 18.2%
Brazil
Oil 818,654,645 12%
Soybeans and other seeds 2,381,576,901 42.7%
Iron 2,575,374,873 37.8%
Pulp and Paper 372,549,748 5.5%
Meat 464,630,823 6.5%
Chile
Copper Ores 2,205,461,023 16.2%
Copper Alloys 1,692,789,989 8.5%
Pulp and Paper 325,269,717 24.8%
Feedstuff 169,337,323 31.4%
Peru
Copper Ores 1,303,296,018 22.4%
Feedstuff 423,127,024 36.3%
% Total Country Exports in 
Sector
Share of China Exports in Selected Countries and Sectors, 2006
 
 
Source: Authors calculations based on (United Nations Statistics Division 2008) 
 
What stands out most is that 73.7 percent of all soybeans exported from Argentina were 
destined for China and that 42.7 percent of all soybeans exported from Brazil went to China 
as well.  37.8 percent of all Brazil’s Iron exports went to China.  Only in the case of Brazil’s 
pulp and paper and meat sectors and Chile’s copper alloy sector were China exports less 
than ten percent of each country’s total exports in those sectors. 
 
It should come as no surprise then that these countries and sectors are the recipients 
of foreign direct investment from China.  Table 3 exhibits 2006 (same year as data in Tables 
2 and 3) investments in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru.  It is also important to note that 
every country in Latin America went from having a trade surplus with China in 1995 to a 
trade deficit in 2006—except for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru (Gallagher and 
Porzecanski 2008). 
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Table 3: Major 2006 Chinese Investments in LAC 
 
Argentina 
In February 2006, the periodical Business News Americas announced that Chinese steel trading 
company Sinosteel corporation was considering an undisclosed but significant investment in the 
Argentine iron ore miner Hiparsa with the express purpose of increasing iron ore production to meet 
Chinese demand. Separately, in the transportation sector, the Chinese have discussed participation in 
improving the Cristo Redentor and Aguas Negras passes. The passes are key chokepoints on highways 
used to ship Argentine products over the Andes mountains for ultimate export via Chile’s Pacific ports. 
In the winter, snows routinely close the passes, delaying the transit of Argentine products to 
destinations such as China. 
 
Brazil 
Chinese deals and acquisition activity have focused on Brazil’s iron and steel and petroleum sectors. 
With respect to the former, the Chinese firm Baosteel and the Brazilian firm Companhia Vale do Rio 
Doce (CVRD) began talks in July 2004 to construct an iron ore production facility in Brazil. CVRD 
was subsequently rumored to be in joint venture talks with the Chinese firm Minmetals, although no 
concrete deals have emerged as of the time that this article went to press. In February 2006, Metals and 
the Metallurgical Construction Group of China finalized a deal providing Gerdau S.A. $235 million to 
increase its steelmaking capacity in Brazil. With respect to petroleum, in November 2004, the Brazilian 
state firm Petrobras signed a $10 billion commitment to cooperate with the Chinese firm Sinopec in 
prospecting for oil, refining, and constructing pipelines in Brazil. Subsequently, in July 2005, Petrobras 
signed a long-term contract to sell 12 million barrels of oil per day to the PRC firm Sinochem for $600 
million. In addition to these commitments, China has proposed $4.8 billion in investments to 
modernize the Brazilian railway system--facilitating Brazil’s ability to get its iron ore, steel, and other 
products to market for export to destinations such as the PRC. 
 
Chile 
In February 2006, China Minmetals and China Development Bank finalized a deal providing the 
Chilean state copper company Codelco with up to $2 billion in financing through advance commodity 
purchases so that Codelco could increase its mining capacity for export to China. Codelco is the 
world’s largest copper supplier, while the PRC is Chile’s number one export customer. The deal also 
included an option to sell Minmetals a 25-49% interest in the new Gaby mineral field for an additional 
$900 million. 
 
Peru 
On February 27, 2006, the Peruvian congress approved a massive project in which the Chinese 
consortium Shandong Luneng would invest $2 billion to significantly upgrade the port facility at 
Tacna, and another $8 billion to build new highway and rail links connecting Tacna to the El Mutún 
mineral field in eastern Bolivia. Shandong Luneng is also one of the major bidders for the El Mutún 
concession, which has been repeatedly delayed by the Bolivian government. Securing both projects 
would thus give a major PRC firm an integrated supply network for extracting iron from the region. In 
addition to Tacna, another $300 million in smaller PRC investment projects are also contemplated for 
the Peruvian mining, petroleum and fishing industries. In the hydrocarbon sector Chinese position in 
Peru was also bolstered by the China National Offshore Development Corporation (CNODC) purchase 
of a 45% interest in PlusPetrol Norte, a subsidiary of the Argentine firm PlusPetrol. The acquisition has 
given China a presence in the Camisea gas fields--a project that has recently come on-line and is 
significantly boosting Peru’s natural gas output, and rapidly making Peru a significant player in the the 
region’s natural gas supply. 
 
Source: (Ellis 2006, accessed, May 10, 2008, quoted verbatim) 
 
 
Indirect Effects 
 
Indirectly, during the boom increases in Chinese demand tightened supplies and 
raised global prices for many commodities, leading to a rise in exports.  More directly of 
course, China’s appetite for commodities has increased bi-lateral trade between LAC and 
China.  This drove up prices and increased overall demand for LAC goods (IMF, 2008).   
 
Table 4 lists LAC’s top 17 commodities exports by their total exports (in dollars) in 
2006.  These top exports were just shy of half of all LAC’s exports during the period and 
grew on average of 110 percent over the period.  Far and away the largest export was crude 
oil, which alone accounted for more than 18 percent of all LAC’s exports. 
 
 
Table 4 
Sector 2000 2006 00-06 Growth
Chinese Import 
Growth/Total World 
ExportGrowth
Crude oil 48,987,186,770 112,575,599,155 129.8% 5.5%
Base Metals 7,211,709,637 26,183,980,627 263.1% 19.7%
Copper 7,628,915,967 25,749,477,183 237.5% 10.8%
Refined Petroleum 16,620,782,467 18,806,398,334 13.1% 5.2%
Meat 3,535,083,967 11,070,973,817 213.2% -1.6%
Iron ore and concentrates 3,811,562,912 9,425,950,165 147.3% 54.8%
Feedstuff 6,413,819,994 9,414,473,361 46.8% 2.6%
Fruit and nuts 6,609,994,529 9,214,179,325 39.4% 0.1%
Sugar and honey 3,293,727,533 8,358,410,784 153.8% 1.8%
Soybeans 4,155,155,048 8,209,199,475 97.6% 57.8%
Natural Gas 1,422,921,528 8,053,331,973 466.0% 1.8%
Coffee and coffee substitutes 6,320,846,594 7,400,327,391 17.1% 1.5%
Vegatable oils, crude or refined 2,413,049,966 5,123,976,205 112.3% 8.4%
Aluminium 3,211,590,964 4,533,157,750 41.1% 1.4%
Fresh Vegetables 3,322,155,825 4,531,071,548 36.4% 4.2%
Alcoholic beverages 2,757,791,184 4,188,139,047 51.9% 2.5%
Fish, fresh, chilled or frozen 2,551,440,823 3,982,054,605 56.1% 9.3%
Pulp and waste paper 3,325,463,834 3,915,651,191 17.7% 118.9%
Average 7,421,844,419 15,596,463,996 110% 17%
Latin America's Top Commodities Exports in Context
(2005USD)
 
Source: Authors calculations based on (United Nations Statistics Division 2008) 
 
The last column in Table 4 exhibits the share of Chinese import growth as a percent 
of world export growth in a particular sector.  For instance, Chinese imports account for 5.5 
percent of the growth in crude petroleum exports between 2000 and 2006.  In many sectors 
Chinese demand accounts for well over 10 percent of total world export growth during the 
period and on average it accounted for 17 percent of the rise in demand for LAC’s top 
exports.  Base metals, copper, iron ore, soy, and pulp and paper are all highlighted in bold 
 11
because they are the core LAC exports to China that are discussed above.  Chinese demand 
for global exports in these products iwas quite high, with 54 percent of the increase in world 
iron ore exports going to China, 57.8 percent of all soy, and more than 118.9 percent of pulp 
and paper.  In other words, indirectly through demand and subsequent price increases, China 
was indirectly responsible for much of Latin America’s commodity export boom. 
 
The analysis conducted in this part of the paper has shown that China is having a 
significant impact on LAC, but not necessarily in all the ways portrayed by some.  Many 
countries simply do not export the goods that China impacted directly through global 
demand and price increases or through bi-lateral trade. Other research shows that such 
trends may not change.  In addition, only ten sectors in six countries account for the 
majority of China-LAC trade during the boom.  For those countries and sectors that were 
“winners,” China both propped up world prices and accounted for a large part of the export 
increase in those countries.  Now that the boom has come to a halt, it worth analyzing 
whether despite its obvious benefits, the boom also posed a development challenge to Latin 
America. To this question we now turn. 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
 
These findings raise a number of concerns regarding the impact that China has in Latin 
America that run counter to the more euphoric tone about the LAC-China relationship that 
could be found in the popular press and some of the literature during the boom.  There are 
three key questions of concern that need to be addressed by researchers and policy makers.  
For the small handful of LAC countries that are benefiting from China trade: 
 
1. Beyond the boom, how long can LAC depend on increasing Chinese demand for 
LAC commodities, and similarly, to what extent –in the long term- will prices for 
such commodities remain high? 
2. To what extent will future China trade result in a “resource curse” problem for LAC 
given that China trade is largely in commodities? 
3. How well are LAC governments equipped to capture increased revenues from 
growing commodities exports and are the revenues being used to stabilize and 
diversify the economy? 
 
There are grounds for optimism on all three levels.  Estimates conducted before the 
outset of the financial crisis concluded that for the most important export sectors to China, 
Chinese demand would continue its rise for some time to come.  Regarding Dutch Disease, 
there is cause for concern but more research is needed.  During the period analysed there 
was a slight appreciation in the currencies of the four key countries relative to others in 
LAC.  There is also some evidence that export surges to China are taking a heavy toll on the 
environment.  In addition, LAC manufacturing industries are indeed losing competitiveness 
compared with China.   On the question of revenue gains, because of past crises LAC has 
considerably more institutions that can capture gains from commodities booms but analysts 
have expressed concern that the purse strings are being held tight.  Nevertheless, LAC has a 
better opportunity than it has had in decades, even in the wake of the crisis. An opportunity 
that should be seized. 
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The Future of Chinese Demand and High Commodities Prices 
 
Before the financial crisis hit, economic growth in China was expected to continue 
its unprecedented expansion for at least another decade or more. Estimates of Chinese 
economic growth have been corrected downward in light of the economic crisis, but they 
remain positive nonetheless. High prices for commodities are another matter however.  
Most forecasts estimate that recent commodity boom was fairly unique and may last longer 
than those in the past—but not forever. Such projections, however, are pre-crisis and prices 
have been pushing downward since 2008. This means that the past and any future booms are 
indeed opportunities for those countries benefiting from them, but won’t be if nations don’t 
act quickly. 
 
Forecasting future Chinese growth has become a cottage industry, but most 
conservative forecasts put annual growth rates for China between 7.1 and 8.6 percent to 
2020 (Jianwu, Li, and Polaski 2007).  In 2006 Deutsche Bank Research put together 
estimates of future Chinese demand in key commodities from Africa and South America.  
Deutsche Bank projects increased demand for all of the important sectors analyzed in the 
previous section. Indeed, Table 5 shows that in every sector except for soy, pre-crisis 
estimates of future growth will exceed 10 percent per annum. 
 
 
Table 5 
 
Commodity
2006 2020 Total Annual
Oil 91 1860 1940 20
Iron 148 710 380 10
Soy 26 50 80 4
Copper 3 20 600 10
Meat 0.3 4 1260 20
Pulp and Paper* 34 150 330 10
*m cubic meters
Projections for China's Commodity Import Demand
Annual Demand Percent Change, 2006-2020
(m tons)
 
Source:  (Deutsche Bank Research 2006) 
 
The Deutsche Bank Research team argues that soy demand will not be as significant as in 
other sectors:   
 
“Soy imports have risen steadily as domestic production struggles to fulfill rising 
demand.  Growth in soybean demand has been mainly driven by increased 
consumption of soybean oil and soybean meal (both outputs of the crushing 
process). Especially demand for soybean meal which is used to feed livestock and is 
thus driven by demand for meat—was a major driver of Chinese soybean import 
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growth.  This makes future Chinese demand for soybeans difficult to predict.  While 
human consumption of soybeans and soybean oil is likely to increase further, 
demand growth for soybean meal could decrease as livestock cultivation faces limits 
and imports of meats and other animal products gain ground.  Therefore, overall 
demand growth for soybeans is likely to lag behind other commodities.” (Deutsche 
Bank Research 2006: 5).  
 
Although soy demand is predicted to grow the relatively slow—Table 7 shows it is 
still predicted to almost double by 2020.  Doubling is quite large but seems smaller given that 
other commodities such as meat, crude oil and others are expected to grow by a factor of 
three or more. 
 
Chinese growth may continue for the foreseeable future but high prices for 
commodities in general may not.  The International Monetary Fund (IMF) reminds us that 
although the prices for commodities are currently high they remain below their historical 
levels, are highly volatile, and over the long term are predicted to continue their downward 
trend.  Since 1957 commodity prices have fallen relative to consumer prices at a rate of 
about 1.6 percent annually.  However, volatility is more the norm than price decline—one 
standard deviation of annual price changes is close to 11 percent, compared to the 1.6 
percent annual decline. The IMF attributes such falls to productivity gains in agricultural and 
metals parts of the economy relative to others (International Monetary Fund 2006).   
 
 
 
Figure 3 
 
World Commodities Prices and LAC Terms of Trade
1970 to 2007
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Source: (International Monetary Fund 2008) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 exhibits declining non-energy prices (on the first vertical axis) with the 
downward trend line in jagged black.  Terms of trade in Latin America are scaled to the 
second vertical axis and are also declining over the long term. This long-term deterioration 
of the terms of trade for commodities has been thoroughly documented for a longer period 
of time (see Ocampo and Parra 2003 for an analysis for the whole twentieth century) and has 
been a core concern for long term development in Latin America since the formulation of 
the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (Prébisch 1951).  
 
However it is quite clear that both prices and the terms of trade for Latin America 
increased 2000 until before the crisis. The IMF does acknowledge that the recent boom was 
one of the longest and largest in recorded history.  For the average country the boom lasted 
over four years and caused an improvement in the terms of trade by 9 percent, while past 
booms lasted on average two years and changed terms of trade by 3 percent (International 
Monetary Fund 2008).  Before the crisis, some analysts forecasted price increases through 
2015.  The International Food Policy Research Institute predicted that soy and soy oils 
would see significant increases until that year (International Food Policy Research Institute 
2008).  As Figure 5 shows, these prices have started to slide below their 2000 levels. 
 
 A closer look at the specific sectors benefiting from China trade shows a slightly 
different pattern.  The long term trend for the agricultural commodities slopes downward 
but the trend for non-renewable natural resources was on the rise until the crisis.  Figure 4 
shows these commodities from 1960 to 2007.  Indeed the bump up since 2002 in Figure 2 
seems to be in large part a function of Copper, Iron, and Pulp and Paper princes, not 
agricultural ones. 
 
Figure 4 
 
 15
Real Commodities Prices, 1960 to 2007
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Source: author’s calculations based on World Bank, 2008 
 
 
What remains to be seen is to be seen is how long the increase in commodity prices and the 
resulting improvement of terms of trade will actually last, and whether these improvements 
will reverse the downward trend observed since the beginning of the twentieth century 
(Ocampo and Parra 2003). In fact, while the small range of estimates available quibble 
regarding how long price increases will last, even before the crisis there was consensus over 
the fact that they would eventually decline and that the commodity boom would not put 
LAC on the verge of long-term economic growth with current account surpluses. 
(International Monetary Fund 2006; Ocampo 2007). Moreover, despite the long term trends 
shown in the figure above, post-crisis estimates have begun to show a downward trend in 
2009.  
 
 
Figure 5 
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Estimated Price Decreases, 2008-2009 Percentage Variation
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Source: (International Monetary Fund 2009) 
 
LAC, China, and the Resource Curse 
 
 
If many “ifs” materialize China’s presence in Latin American export baskets may be grounds 
for concern over the extent to which Chinese and global demand for LAC commodities will 
inflict LAC with “Dutch Disease,” or the “Resource Curse.” 
If future demand from China and the indirect effect that China demand may have on higher 
commodities prices in general rebounds, it is possible that some Latin American countries 
will have larger shares of primary and resource based products in their export baskets.  This 
raises concerns over Dutch Disease: resource dependent countries do not develop strongly 
because they are victims of a “resource curse.” Nations overly dependent on commodities 
have been shown to de-industrialize because discoveries of such resources raise the value of 
a nation's currency and make manufactured and agricultural goods as well as services less 
competitive, eventually increasing imports, decreasing exports, creating balance of payments 
problems, and leading to poor economic performance (Sachs and Warner 1995). 
Thus far there is only slight (if any) evidence toward the signs of a resource curse.  If we 
were to observe Dutch Disease we would expect to see appreciating exchange rates and 
declining shares of manufacturing as a percent of GDP. 
 
Table 6 
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2000-2007 2002-2007
Mexico 1.1 5.9
Argentina 85.7 -27.8
Brazil -20.2 -44.6
Chile -3.8 -23.5
Colombia -25.5 -31.7
Ecuador -35.2 -4.1
Peru -4.4 -7.2
Percentage Changes in Exchange Rate          
(Local currency per dollar)
 
 
Source: (World Bank 2008, accessed May 5, 2008) 
 
Table 6 exhibits real exchange rates for the six countries identified as those with 
significant China trade from 2000 to 2007, and then again for 2002 to 2007 because 2002 is 
often seen as the beginning of the commodities boom. During the entire period, Mexico, 
and Argentina see depreciation of the currency, though Argentina’s is clearly a recovery from 
its crisis.  In the boom period, 2002-2007, in all countries there has been a significant 
appreciation of the currency except for in the relatively more manufacturing centered 
nations of Mexico. 
 
Figures for industrial structure reveal that at present there has been no significant 
change—except for the case of Chile.  In Brazil and Peru the percent of GDP in 
manufactures has remain unchanged between 1995 and 2007, and in Argentina there has 
been an increase by almost 5 percentage points.  In Chile however, manufactures were 18.1 
percent of GDP in 1995 and 15.7 percent of GDP in 2007.  Of course, whether looking at 
exchange rate changes or changes in industrial structure, these trends may be in no way 
related to China whatsoever.  Such analyses are beyond the scope of this paper but should be 
examined in detail for future research.  The point here is that presently there are no 
noticeable changes that would make one cry resource curse, but theoretically the possibility 
remains. 
Barbier (2004) extends the resource curse analysis for Latin America and shows that 
this problem has plagued Latin America in the past and that because of LAC’s skewed 
distribution of wealth and poor has also exacerbated environmental degradation and social 
inequity during commodity booms.  Barbier shows how LAC has often growth through 
“frontier land expansion” but that in the end such expansion did not generate rents 
substantial enough to be reinvested in other productive activities nor does it generate 
enough linkages and productivity spillovers to achieve broad-based, sustainable growth. 
How and why does this happen? LAC attracts investors in commercial agriculture, mining, 
timber extraction, and these investors tended to be among the more wealthy people in the 
country or across the globe. Such intensive extractive activity and actors in the “frontier,” 
along with the accompanying pressure from population increases and water use, leads to 
excessive resource conversion. 
According to Barbier, significant rents did not accrue over the long run – though 
there are undoubtedly booms – because the resources get depleted over time and because of 
 18
government and market failures in the form of rent seeking, corruption, and open access 
problems. The limited rents that did accrue were seldom redistributed for more dynamic 
economic activity (nor to investing in natural capital or the poor) because these actors 
benefit from rent-seeking activities resulting from further frontier expansion. What is more, 
to Barbier resource based activities essentially became rural enclaves far away from centers 
that could form significant backward linkages or knowledge spillovers. The rents that did 
accrue, went to wealthy individuals, who have increased incentive for “rent-seeking” 
behavior that is in turn supported by policy distortions that reinforce the existing pattern of 
allocating and distributing natural resources.  
Figures 6 and 7 exhibit how this may have occurred recently in Brazil with respect to 
frontier soy expansion in Brazil.  Remember from Table 4 that 42.7 percent of all Brazilian 
soy exports (over 20 percent of total soy production) is destined for China.  Figures 6 and 7 
exhibit the expansion of soybean production into the environmentally sensitive Amazon 
region between 1990 and 2005.  In 1990, 88 percent of all soy production was located in the 
state of Mato Grosso.  However, by 2005 that figure was only 40 percent and soy production 
has expanded into Maranhao, Para, Acre, Roraima, and Rondonia. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: 
 
Soy Expansion in the Amazon, 1990 
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 Source: (Vera-Diaz et al. 2008) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 
 
Soy Expansion in the Amazon, 2005 
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 Source: (Vera-Diaz et al. 2008) 
 
Alongside the possibility of exchange rate appreciation and environmental 
degradation, Dutch disease could also cause a lack of competitiveness for non-commodity 
sectors.  Here a great deal of work has been conducted comparing China and LAC and the 
extent to which China will out-compete LAC in world markets.  In other words, is China 
penetrating (or have the potential to penetrate) world export markets at a faster rate than 
firms in LAC?   
 
Table 7 shows that China has “climbed up the manufacturing ladder” while the few 
LAC countries that were competitive in manufacturing are struggling to hold their ground.  
This table shows the share of a country’s manufactures exports as a percent of total 
manufacturing exports from 1980 to 2006.  During the entire period only Argentina, Brazil, 
Peru, and Mexico were ever truly competitive on a global level. 
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1990
Fmr Fed. Rep. of Germany 17.0% Japan 17.2% Fmr Fed. Rep. of Germany 15.6% USA 12.8% USA 14.5% Germany 11.8%
USA 15.4% Fmr Fed. Rep. of Ge 14.8% USA 13.0% Japan 12.4% Japan 10.4% USA 10.3%
Japan 13.8% USA 14.2% Japan 12.8% Germany 12.2% Germany 10.2% China 10.1%
France 8.4% France 6.6% France 6.9% France 6.1% France 5.3% Japan 8.2%
United Kingdom 8.0% Italy 6.4% Italy 6.6% Italy 5.8% China 5.0% France 5.0%
Italy 7.0% United Kingdom 6.1% United Kingdom 6.2% United Kingdom 5.2% Italy 4.7% Italy 4.5%
Belgium-Luxembourg 4.2% Canada 4.5% Belgium-Luxembourg 3.6% China, Hong Kong SAR 4.8% United Kingdom 4.6% China, Hong Kong SAR 4.0%
Netherlands 3.6% Belgium-Luxembourg 3.2% China, Hong Kong SAR 3.5% China 3.6% China, Hong Kong SAR 4.5% United Kingdom 4.0%
Canada 2.8% Netherlands 3.0% Netherlands 3.2% Rep. of Korea 3.4% Canada 3.7% Rep. of Korea 3.9%
Switzerland 2.5% Rep. of Korea 2.8% Canada 3.0% Belgium-Luxembourg 3.2% Rep. of Korea 3.6% Belgium 3.4%
Sweden 2.4% China, Hong Kong S 2.8% Rep. of Korea 2.8% Canada 3.1% Mexico 3.3% Netherlands 3.0%
China, Hong Kong SAR 2.0% Switzerland 2.2% Switzerland 2.3% Netherlands 3.0% Belgium 2.8% Canada 2.8%
Rep. of Korea 1.8% Sweden 2.1% China 2.0% Singapore 2.9% Singapore 2.7% Singapore 2.7%
Austria 1.5% Spain 1.5% Sweden 1.9% Switzerland 2.0% Netherlands 2.7% Mexico 2.5%
Spain 1.5% Austria 1.3% Spain 1.8% Spain 1.9% Spain 1.9% Spain 2.1%
Poland 1.2% Singapore 1.1% Singapore 1.7% Mexico 1.8% Malaysia 1.8% Malaysia 1.6%
Denmark 1.0% Brazil 1.0% Austria 1.6% Malaysia 1.6% Switzerland 1.5% Switzerland 1.5%
Singapore 0.9% Denmark 0.9% Denmark 0.9% Sweden 1.6% Sweden 1.4% Sweden 1.4%
Finland 0.7% Finland 0.7% Malaysia 0.7% Austria 1.3% Thailand 1.2% Austria 1.3%
Norway 0.6% Czechoslovakia 0.7% Brazil 0.7% Thailand 1.2% Ireland 1.1% Thailand 1.2%
Ireland 0.4% Poland 0.6% Finland 0.7% Denmark 0.8% Austria 1.0% Czech Rep. 1.0%
India 0.4% Ireland 0.6% Ireland 0.7% Ireland 0.8% Philippines 0.8% Ireland 1.0%
Australia 0.4% Norway 0.5% Thailand 0.6% Finland 0.7% Denmark 0.7% Poland 1.0%
Portugal 0.3% Turkey 0.5% Portugal 0.6% Brazil 0.6% Indonesia 0.7% Turkey 0.9%
So. African Customs Union 0.3% Malaysia 0.4% Czechoslovakia 0.5% Portugal 0.5% Finland 0.7% Brazil 0.9%
Malaysia 0.3% Portugal 0.4% Mexico 0.5% Indonesia 0.5% Brazil 0.7% Hungary 0.8%
Greece 0.2% India 0.4% Fmr Yugoslavia 0.5% India 0.5% India 0.6% India 0.8%
Argentina 0.2% China 0.4% India 0.4% Czech Rep. 0.5% Hungary 0.6% Denmark 0.8%
Thailand 0.2% Israel 0.3% Norway 0.4% Turkey 0.5% Czech Rep. 0.6% Finland 0.7%
Philippines 0.1% Australia 0.3% Turkey 0.4% Poland 0.4% Poland 0.5% Russian Federation 0.6%
New Zealand 0.1% Thailand 0.2% Poland 0.3% Australia 0.4% Turkey 0.5% Philippines 0.6%
Hungary 0.1% Greece 0.2% Australia 0.3% Israel 0.3% Russian Federation 0.5% Indonesia 0.5%
Saudi Arabia 0.1% Pakistan 0.2% Israel 0.3% Norway 0.3% Israel 0.4% Portugal 0.4%
Tunisia 0.1% Argentina 0.2% Indonesia 0.3% So. African Customs Union 0.3% Portugal 0.4% Slovakia 0.4%
China, Macao SAR 0.1% Venezuela 0.1% Pakistan 0.2% Hungary 0.2% Australia 0.3% Ukraine 0.3%
Colombia 0.1% Philippines 0.1% Romania 0.2% Philippines 0.2% South Africa 0.3% South Africa 0.3%
Bangladesh 0.1% Saudi Arabia 0.1% Greece 0.2% Pakistan 0.2% Norway 0.2% Romania 0.3%
Peru 0.1% Indonesia 0.1% Argentina 0.1% Slovenia 0.2% Slovakia 0.2% Australia 0.3%
Indonesia 0.0% New Zealand 0.1% Philippines 0.1% Argentina 0.2% Ukraine 0.2% Israel 0.3%
Morocco 0.0% China, Macao SAR 0.1% Saudi Arabia 0.1% Slovakia 0.2% Pakistan 0.2% Slovenia 0.2%
Cyprus 0.0% United Arab Emirate 0.1% United Arab Emirates 0.1% Romania 0.2% Argentina 0.2% Norway 0.2%
New Caledonia 0.0% Hungary 0.1% Tunisia 0.1% Greece 0.1% Romania 0.2% Saudi Arabia 0.2%
Kenya 0.0% Bangladesh 0.1% Morocco 0.1% Saudi Arabia 0.1% Slovenia 0.2% Pakistan 0.2%
Sri Lanka 0.0% Tunisia 0.1% New Zealand 0.1% Tunisia 0.1% United Arab Emirates 0.1% Argentina 0.2%
Syria 0.0% Morocco 0.1% China, Macao SAR 0.1% Croatia 0.1% Vietnam 0.1% Greece 0.1%
China: Taking Away the (Manufacturing) Ladder?
(percent of World Manufacturing Exports)
1980 1985 1995 20052000
 
Source: Authors calculations based on (United Nations Statistics Division 2008) 
 
 
In 1980, China was not even in the top 100 countries for most competitive 
manufacturing exports, by 2006 they were the most competitive (if you add China to Hong 
Kong).  Brazil and Argentina’s competitiveness has been sliding and since China joined the 
WTO. Mexico has been struggling as well. 
 
Many have argued that China is not a threat to LAC’s competitiveness, but only take 
a short and intermediate term view.  Because LAC is not competitive in manufacturing they 
therefore have literally nothing to be outcompeted for.  This is not necessarily good news 
given how important manufacturing exports are to growth.   
 
Estimating the different determinants of LAC exports, a World Bank study finds no 
evidence to support the argument that Chinese exports are replacing LAC exports in the 
world marketplace.  Rather, they find the growth in Chinese exports to third markets to lead 
to an increase in LAC exports to these markets equivalent to 32 percent of LAC exports in 
2004, a result the authors interpret to mean that exports from China and from LAC 
complement rather than substitute each other in world markets. This World Bank study also 
finds a positive impact of Chinese exports to LAC on LAC exports to third markets, 
suggesting that imports of a larger variety of cheaper Chinese goods are positively affecting 
LAC’s competitiveness in third markets (Lederman, Olarreaga, and Perry 2006). However, a 
recent IDB study notes that over time the two areas’ export profiles are beginning to 
converge and therefore fierce competition could ensue in the future:  
 
“As China and Latin America –and Mexico in particular- have converged toward 
increasingly similar export baskets, especially in manufacturing industries, direct 
competition has intensified” (Devlin, Estevadeordal, and Rodriguez-Clare 2006).  
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Lall and Weiss tackle this question using a different approach. They look at the 
evolution of China and LAC export shares in both the world and US markets and look for 
evidence of increased Chinese competition in products that show increased penetration of 
Chinese exports in coincidence of decrease penetration of LAC exports. More specifically, 
they define a category in which China’s market share is rising (for either the world market or 
the US market) and LAC’s decreasing as a category in which LAC is experiencing a “direct 
threat” from China. Similarly, they define a category in which both China’s and LAC’s shares 
are increasing but China’s share is increasing faster as a category in which LAC is 
experiencing a “partial threat” from China(Lall and Weiss 2005) (Mesquita Moreira 2007).  
We replicate this methodology and find that 83.2 percent of LAC manufacturing exports are 
under threat (62 direct, 21 partial) from China.  However, the majority of those exports are 
concentrated in Mexico, Brazil, and elsewhere. 
 
In the short term LAC is not threatened by Chinese exports abroad because the 
composition (or structure) of LAC exports are strikingly different from China’s.  Mexico 
however is an exception because it has a very similar export profile to China.  Mexico is 
losing market shares or at least growing more slowly than China in many important world 
markets (Gallagher, Moreno-Brid, and Porzecanski 2008).  Another way of looking at this 
evidence however is that Mexico is under threat right now and that the rest of Latin 
America—given it does not yet have a significant portion of its export basket and 
manufactures—faces a daunting task if it were ever to focus on diversifying its economies. 
 
 
Revenue sharing, Stabilization, and Diversification 
 
Related to the promise of high prices and future demand from China is the question 
regarding whether Latin American nations are equipped to capture the rents from such high 
prices and demand and to use them for general savings and for economic diversification 
(Rodrik 2005; Cypher 2007).   
 
Recent studies have conducted fairly comprehensive examinations of these 
questions.  The results are mixed.  On the one hand, all of the major commodities exporting 
countries to China have seen increases in revenue due to high export prices and overall 
increases in the volume of trade.  Moreover, many of the countries have created new funds 
and laws that govern the use of revenue derived from price increases in commodities 
exports.  However, at present there is little indication that such funds will be used for 
economic diversification and poverty alleviation.  Indeed, in the wake of the crisis the 
majority of these funds have been used to defend currencies and bail-out banking systems. 
 
The large price increases and increases in demand for PRBP exports in the countries 
analyzed above has lead to a significant increase in government revenue.  Because of new tax 
schemes and funds, the majority of countries in LAC have increased fiscal revenues by 3 
percent of GDP or more (Jiménez and Tromben 2006). 
 
In Brazil government revenues have actually become positive since 1999 and reached a 
maximum surplus of 4.6 percent of GDP in 2004.   In Brazil’s case however, fiscal revenue 
increases have largely been a result of economic growth, a diversified tax base, and 
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reductions in spending.  In other words, the commodities boom contributed very little either 
positively or negatively to Brazil’s fiscal position (Gottshalk and Prates 2006).  In 2008, 
Argentina attempted to increase an already sizeable export tax on agricultural exports, yet 
such an increase was met by widespread discontent and farmer riots and forced the 
government to partially back down.  
 
In the case of Chile and Peru however, the situation is different.  Chile’s government 
revenues have grown significantly and this has been chiefly due to higher copper revenues.  
Chile also had a fiscal surplus in 2004, of 2.2 percent of GDP.  Between 1999 and 2004 
copper explained 29.3 percent of total government revenue, but 59 percent for 2003 and 
2004.  The share of copper revenues in government revenue was 2.4 percent from 1999 to 
2002, but lept between 12.6 and 17.6 percent in 2004.  The state-owned copper company 
CODELCO (while only 37 percent of copper production) accounted for 75 percent of 
government revenues from copper in 2004 (Gottshalk and Prates 2006).  Chile’s copper 
funds in part are appropriated into the Copper Compensation Fund (FCC). 
 
Peru has also experienced a fiscal surplus.  Here however the share of the copper 
sector in total government revenue has not changed as dramatically as in the case of Chile.  
Revenues from gold and copper revenues combined (separate statistics for copper are 
unavailable) explained 4.5 percent of the growth of central government revenue between 
1999 and 2004 but rose to just 6.7 percent for 2004.   In Peru, two private firms (Southern 
Peru Copper Corporation and Antamina) account for 74 percent of copper production.  
Though a 30 percent tax on profits has been the main source of government revenues, 
extractive industries are exempt from royalty payments and can deduct for infrastructure 
investments (Gottshalk and Prates 2006).   
 
At this writing it is hard to tell whether such increases in revenue are being used for 
poverty alleviation or economic diversification.  In all of the countries in LAC that have 
experienced increases in tax revenue such increases have not been matched by a 
proportional increase in spending.  In many cases this is simply counter-cyclical—taking in 
funds when prices, exports, and growth are relatively strong and spending when things begin 
to slow down.  In other cases there is evidence of new spending for social programs but they 
are seen as being inefficiently run and therefore have not shown up with concrete results  
(Clements, Faircloth, and Verhoeven 2007).  
 
Moreover, in many of the countries’ new funds are being spent to pay down debt 
and get to surplus status (as mentioned earlier surpluses have only recently been reached).  
Although the majority of countries have stabilization funds, virtually all of them have 
stipulations where these funds are pre-committed for macroeconomic stabilization (Jiménez 
and Tromben 2006).  One study concluded that “as a result, the population at large and the 
poor in particular have not seen the benefits of the export boom, at least not through higher 
government expenditures as a proportion of GDP, on social and other programmes.”  
(Gottshalk and Prates 2006: 18).  Cypher (2007) has argued that the lack of forward thinking 
regarding the utilization of new revenues could plague LAC for decades to come unless 
some portion of the funds are used to diversify economic structure.  Cypher depicts the 
present as an enormous opportunity but the result of short-sightedness, he warns, will result 
in a ‘primarization’ of LAC that could leave the region vulnerable to underdevelopment. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In this paper we sought to provide a more critical analysis of China’s impact on the 
recent Latin American commodity boom.  In the recent boom, Latin American export 
growth, which was considerably faster than GDP growth, was being driven by a 
commodities boom.  Indeed, 70 percent of the growth in LAC exports has been due to 
growth in commodities exports, and commodities exports comprised 74 percent of all LAC 
exports. China had both indirect and direct effects on this trend.  Directly, LAC exports to 
China increased by 370 percent since 2000.  This has been the cause of much cheer, but 
should be analyzed with more scrutiny. Indirectly, Chinese consumption of global 
commodities was making them scarcer and boosting global prices and therefore leading to 
more LAC exports.   
 
LAC exports to China were only 3.8 percent of all LAC exports.  In other words, 
96.2 percent of all LAC exports did not go to China. LAC’s exports to China comprised 5.8 
percent of Chinese imports, the same level of LAC exports to China in the 1980s;  74 
percent of all LAC exports to China were in primary commodities;  growth in LAC exports 
to China was only 8 percent of all LAC export growth since the boom began in 2000; 10 
sectors in six countries accounted for 74 percent of all LAC exports to China and 91 percent 
of all commodities exports to China; for the other countries in LAC the potential to trade 
with China is very low. 
 
For the handful of countries that were “winning” the export game with China, will 
Chinese demand and high prices continue and will such longer term trends boomerang back 
to LAC in the form of Dutch Disease?  By all pre-crisis accounts, the commodities boom 
and Chinese demand were predicted to last relatively long, even though in early 2009 
estimates it was already clear that the boom had come to a halt. Pre-crisis estimates predicted 
that the commodities boom would be among the longest in history by lasting perhaps 
another 10 years. China demand for the products LAC supplies is predicted out at least 20 
more years. It remains to be seen how these predictions fare in light of the recent economic 
and financial crisis.  
 
 Regarding Dutch Disease more research is needed to examine the independent and 
significance of an effect of China trade on LAC exchange rates and industrial composition.  
We do know that exchange rates are appreciating and that the handful of nations in LAC 
with manufacturing competitiveness are losing some of that competitiveness vis-à-vis China.  
Moreover, at least in Brazil there is evidence of a “frontier land expansion” in the 
environmentally sensitive Amazon in part due to China’s demand for soy. 
 
Research indicates that LAC is more equipped than in the past to capture some of 
the rent from the recent and potential future commodities booms and use some of those 
funds for poverty alleviation, environmental protection, and industrial development.  Almost 
all the countries that benefited have some sort of institutional structure in place for such 
activity, though few are showing signs of putting them to proper use at present.  Indeed, in 
the current crisis environment it is very unlikely that such funds will go toward longer-term 
structural concerns such as industrial diversification. 
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